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SYMPOSIUM 2004:  COMBATTING CORRUPTION 
 
THE EUROPEAN UNION AND ROMANIAN 
MENTALITATE:  
A CASE STUDY OF CORRUPTION 
 
Kandis Scott 
In Romania, petty corruption – the bribes, the gifts, the cheating 
that grease the wheels of daily life – presents a problem different from the 
large-scale corruption discussed at this Conference.1  Ending low-level 
corruption requires a change in community attitudes, which is not the 
usual realm of legal rules or within the expressive or social norm function 
of law.  The pervasive low-level corruption in Romania reflects a cultural 
bar to fighting large-scale cheating.   
Influence of the European Union 
 As an applicant for accession to the European Union in 2007,2 
Romania is now making legal and other changes to comply with 
conditions for admission.  One sticking point is the European Union anti-
corruption requirement, derived from the very general Copenhagen 
criteria:  “rule of law,”  “a functioning market economy” and “the ability 
to take on the obligations of membership.”3  Romania has adopted anti-
                                   
1 Transparency International, National Corruption Report 2003 at 13-14 (examples of 
some large-scale Romanian government corruption), available at 
http://www.transparency.org (last visited Sept. 21, 2004).  
2 European Commission, EU-Romania Relations (2004) (Romania submitted its 
application for accession June 22, 1995), at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/romania/index.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2005).   
3 The European Council adopted criteria for new members’ accession to the Union at a 
1993 meeting in Copenhagen, Denmark.  Candidate countries must achieve “stability of 
institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and 
protection of minorities; the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the 
capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union; and the 
ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of 
political, economic and monetary union.” European Commission, EU Enlargement – A 
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corruption legislation, but according to the European Union Parliament, it 
has not enforced those laws sufficiently.4 
 An example of this is recent Romanian legislation attempting to 
assure the independence of judges from the executive power.5  This formal 
approach to creating the rule of law fails to address a more critical 
situation in the judiciary.  Clients report that attorneys ask for money to 
bribe judges.  Attorneys say this is rare, but do not deny that the practice 
exists.  Judges, aware of the public’s complaint, insist that the lawyers 
usually keep this money.  If an attorney loses the case, the lawyer tells the 
client that the other side gave a bigger bribe, so clients commit to paying 
more next time.  Even if this conventional wisdom is false, that 
Romanians believe bribery to be widespread supports a general cynicism 
that impairs efforts to change the culture of corruption.  Judicial 
independence is not enough. 
Romanians agree with the European Union6 that their nation does 
not fight corruption effectively.  Although a majority of Romanians are 
satisfied with the mass media’s efforts to combat corruption, the work of 
the police, government, and courts was unacceptable to more than 24% of 
the respondents.7  In fact, 17% of those surveyed believe that the 
government had taken no measures against corruption.8  This cynicism 
extends to the private sector also.  For example, 50% of those surveyed 
                                                                                       
Historic Opportunity, available at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/intro/criteria.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2005). 
These general statements, called the Copenhagen Criteria, are the basis for the more 
specific requirements for accession. 
4 European Parliament, 2003 Regular Report on Romania’s progress towards accession, 
EUR. PARL. DOC. (COM (03)676 final OE) at 5-7/27, available at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_2003/pdf/rr_ro_final.pdf. 
5 See, e.g., Lege No. 653, Monitorul Oficial de Romania No. 905, Dec. 12, 2002, 
available at http://www.monitoruloficial.ro/. 
6 European Parliament, supra note 4, at 6-7/27. 
7 Id. at 20. 
8 Id. at 19. 
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believe that wealthy Romanians achieved success by violating the law and 
another 24% believe that personal relationships produced the wealth.  
Only 8% believe rich Romanians acquired their wealth through hard work 
or personal merit.9  But these attitudes do not influence individual 
behavior:  the same Romanian ticket taker who criticizes high level 
corruption, the nation’s failure to defeat it, and the lack of personal 
integrity will admit a friend to a concert without a ticket. 
 Top-level corruption and petty cheating are related. According to 
the Romanian Academic Society, corruption at the top makes it difficult to 
argue that fighting petty bureaucratic corruption is a feasible or worthy 
cause.10  While the European Union aims its efforts at top-level 
government corruption-- the same behavior that troubles ordinary 
Romanians-- it also wants to change low-level cheating.  For example, the 
European Union asks that an “anti-corruption culture develop in public 
service” so that the entrenched culture of corruption does not continue to 
hold the nation back.11  To satisfy the European Union, Romanians have to 
replace their culture of cheating with different social norms.  
Changing Culture 
Romanians must change their mentalitate, the attitudes that the 
Romanians themselves acknowledge and criticize in the abstract.  
Romanians are so inured to petty deceit that they are unconscious of its 
unethical character in specific instances.  This begins in grade school.  
                                   
9 Open Society Foundation, Public Opinion Barometer 17 (October 2003), at 
http://www.osf.ro/en/index.php?option=content&task=view&id=18&Itemid=37 (last 
updated Jan. 25, 2005).  
10 Alina Mungiu Pippidi & Sorin Ionita, Romania’s Struggle for Better Governance, in 
ROMANIA AND BULGARIA BETWEEN NATO AND EU 59 (Romanian Academic Society 
ed., 2003), available at http://www.sar.org.ro/files_h/docs/events/brussels-final.pdf. 
11 European Parliament Resolution on Romania's Application for Membership of the 
European Union and the State of Negotiations, COM (2000) 710 - C5-0610/2000 - 
1997/2172(COS), available at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/docs/ep_resolutions/romania.htm. 
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Students around the world cheat, but unlike most Americans, Romanian 
pupils readily admit doing so.  They blame their onerous workloads (7-12 
courses in a semester all demanding much memorization) and their 
parents’ insistence on high grades (a demand often enforced with a stick).  
Students explain that because the teachers know about the cheating, it is 
no problem.  Their parents also are aware of their cheating but are more 
interested in outstanding marks than personal integrity.   
When I was teaching in Romania, I received a paper not in the 
student’s handwriting.  The girl readily admitted that her father had 
written it because she was busy.  That is the kind of parent who would 
bribe those who grade the college entrance exam.  One high school student 
provoked a “mini-scandal” when she received a 10 on that exam having 
never received higher than a 7 during her school years.  College students 
bribe professors for grades and applicants make payoffs to get a job.  
Corruption exists at all levels.12 
Where does this mentalitate come from?  One explanation is 
grounded in the fact that almost 30% of Romanians are poor.13  Their 
seeing the lifestyles of other Europeans on television produces high but, 
more often than not, frustrated aspirations.  The average reported 
Romanian salary is about $132/month,14 the approximate wage of entry-
                                   
12 Andy Trincia, Corrupting Future Prosecutors: Law School for Dummies, PEACE 
CORPS WRITERS (Nov. 2003), available at  
http://www.peacecorpswriters.org/pages/2003/0311/prntvrs311/pv311pcvrom.html. 
13 The World Bank found 28.9% of Romanians were poor in 2002.  World Bank, 
available at 
http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/eca/eca.nsf/0/C4CFB7B8C4D1658185256C240050A6A4?
OpenDocument (Sep. 2002).  
14 The exact average monthly gross salary in 2000 was $132.61.  This figure is derived by 
dividing the average monthly salary in lei by the average exchange rate, as reported by 
the National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (NISES).  In 2000, the former 
was 2,876,645.  NISES, available at http://www.roembus.org (last visited Jan. 24, 2005). 
The latter was 21,692 per dollar.  NISES, available at 
http://tpb.traderom.ro/En/Cd/frame_gen.htm.  There is a significant but unquantifiable 
under the table economy, but even including that the nation is generally poor. 
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level schoolteachers, who then give private lessons to supplement their 
salaries.  In fact, many successful educators teach school only for the 
social security and medical benefits and to meet potential students for their 
financially rewarding private classes.  Even public bus ticket inspectors 
supplement their salaries with bribes.  A transit rider caught having failed 
to punch his ticket should be fined but often openly negotiates a smaller 
payment made directly to the inspector in the bus.   
Secondly, an “underdeveloped bureaucracy,” not fully modernized 
into an impartial, impersonal, fair institution, staffs Romania’s public 
service.15  Functionaries do not understand professional ethics or see their 
role as that of civil servants, rather than private fixers.  One employee of 
the Romanian Environmental Protection Agency prepared applications for 
environmental permits as a part-time job.  She saw no conflict of interest 
because she did not personally review the applications she prepared--her 
colleague at the next desk did so.  The United States Social Security 
Administration staff does not behave like this and not because employees 
fear criminal prosecution.  Fair dealing is a social norm in America and 
bureaucrats are paid enough to conform to that norm.   
A third explanation for the Romanian mentalitate arises from its 
communist history.  In the worst days of the Ceauşescu regime, there were 
shortages of all consumer goods.  One who worked in a butcher shop 
would hold back a piece of meat for a friend who was saving her the last 
bottle of yogurt in the milk store.  As was true in many socialist states, 
workers would repair their own homes with lumber taken from the 
workplace.  These are not stories of scandals, but rather of survival.  Such 
                                   
15 Pippidi & Ionita, supra note 10, at 58, available at 
http://www.sar.org.ro/files_h/docs/events/brussels-final.pdf. 
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communist-era strategies continue to influence modern Romanian 
attitudes.   
Status also plays a role in creating a culture of corruption.  
Providing discriminatory public service is a norm where there is uneven 
power status.   A favor is granted to assert superior status, not as part of a 
financial exchange.  Seeking a favor acknowledges the higher status of the 
other.  These forces operated even under the communists because Party 
membership accorded status when other forms of social stratification were 
banned.16  In a nation with no middle-class, these power issues remain and 
support petty corruption even where there is no economic gain. 
I experienced this phenomenon personally because, being an 
American in Romania, I had a status that inspired others to assert their yet 
higher status.  I was in Bucharest, an eight-hour train ride from home, 
when the train workers went on strike and the few airplane seats were 
immediately sold.  While interviewing a lawyer at one of the big three 
national labor unions, I described my predicament.  The president of the 
union intervened and assured me he would get me home.  I expected a car 
ride with union members going my way, but he found me a seat on a “sold 
out” plane.  He expected nothing but thanks from me.  His influence is 
called pila and those with high social status use it generously.   
Russell Powell explains a variant of the relationship between status 
and corruption.  Power, often an attribute of status, is exercised over 
underlings by generously permitting their corruption.  Turning a blind eye 
is more controlling than granting a favor because the higher-up can 
withdraw the generosity at any time.  In this way, top-level officials 
dishonestly exploit lower level officials’ practice of corruption to gain 
                                   
16 Pippidi & Ionita, supra note 10, at 59, available at 
http://www.sar.org.ro/files_h/docs/events/brussels-final.pdf. 
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greater power.17  Such systems survive because they become the social 
norm.  Amir Licht observes that in High Power Distinction societies, 
taking advantage of one’s power position is legitimate.  Low power 
persons dislike being taken advantage of but accept it as a fact of life.18  
“Most Romanians . . . loathe this activity, but alas, it’s the ‘system’ and 
they are stuck with it.  Pay to play or you’re not in the game.”19 
The Ineffectiveness of Law 
Trading gifts and money for public services and corrupt attitudes 
arising out of poverty, communist history, or status relationships are not 
readily susceptible to eradication through better implementation of laws as 
demanded by the European Union  
Communist governments punished corruption and expressed anti-
corruption values without affecting Romanian culture.20  In the accession 
process, the European Union is trying for more:  to socialize applicants to 
European Union norms.  It acknowledges the need to change attitudes in 
order “to root out the high level of corruption in state and society.”21  
Although states can adopt European Union standards formally, as 
Romania has done by adopting new anti-corruption laws, the E.U. wants 
                                   
17 Conversation with Russell Powell, Visiting Professor at Santa Clara University School 
of Law, in Santa Clara, Cal. (Mar. 16, 2004). 
18 AMIR N. LICHT, THE PERIOD OF SOCIAL NORMS: A NEW PERSPECTIVE 34 (2001). 
19 Trincia, supra note 12. 
20 See also, Dionysia Tamvaki, The Copenhagen Criteria And The Evolution Of Popular 
Consent To European Union Norms: From Legality To Normative Justifiability In Poland 
And The Czech Republic 22 (Paper prepared for the Workshop: “Implications of 
Enlargement for the Rule of Law, Democracy and Constitutionalism in Post-Communist 
Legal Orders” EUI, Florence, 28-29 November 2003), at 
http://www.google.com/search?q=cache:39A-
tJrVtHQJ:www.iue.it/LAW/Events/WSWorkshopNov2003/Tamvaki_paper.pdf+Dionysi
a+Tamvaki&hl=en&client=firefox-a. (Nov. 2003). 
21 European Parliament, Report On Romania’s Progress Towards Accession 6/27 (2004) 
(emphasis added), available at 
http://www.europarl.eu.int/meetdocs/delegations/roma/ROMA20040318/p5_a(2004)010
3_en.pdf. The European Union contemplates a top down battle against corruption:  
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to habituate the public so that “European Union norms assume [a] ‘taken 
for granted nature.’” 22  Despite these ambitious goals the European 
Union’s efforts have been as unsuccessful as those of the Romanian 
government.   
Using laws or conditions of membership for their expressive 
function23 fails because the meaning of law is a function of the social 
norms, not government intentions.24  A norm exists only where there is a 
consensus about how to behave that affects what people actually do.25  
When citizens internalize a social norm they make it a moral commitment 
with a psychological penalty for its violation.26  Romanians have no such 
commitment to deter petty cheating.  They understand that corruption by 
high officials is wrong, but regard low-level corruption as necessary and 
harmless.  For example, a Romanian official assigned to combat bank 
laundering acknowledged but brushed off the fact that a patient is 
expected to bring a “gift” to a public health doctor.  He saw no connection 
between petty bribery and laundered bribe money.   
Because those responsible for norm management are untrusted 
Romanian politicians, the difficulty of inculcating personal anti-corruption 
attitudes is greater.27  The expressive function of law can support 
individuals who want to change social norms.  For example when a public 
transit system distributes “good conduct guides” asking cell phone users to 
quiet their conversations, passengers are empowered to ask others to lower 
their voices.  But Romanians do not now seek to change their low-level 
                                                                                       
“[T]here must be the political will to eradicate corruption for only this will lead to 
changes in attitude.” Id. at 7/27.  
22 Tamvaki, supra note 20, at 14. 
23 See Cass Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2051 
(1996). 
24 Id. at 2050. 
25 Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585, 587 (1998).   
26 Id. at 585. 
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corruption.  Given no Romanian norm against petty cheating, anti-
corruption laws reflect only the government’s edict, an edict originating 
with the E.U., and do not influence behavior. 
The future for honest Romanians does not lie in the European 
Union’s conditions for membership.  Hope is found in small indications 
that social norms are changing.  In 2003 fewer Romanians were asked for 
and gave “gifts” in exchange for public services than in 2000.28  If true, 
and even if untrue because those surveyed were ashamed to admit bribery, 
these results show changing attitudes.  Secondly, more than Poland and 
The Czech Republic where European Union socialization failed,29 
Romania has traditionally valued things Western and has seen itself as a 
Western nation.  It considers its mentalitate to be an artifact left by its 
Eastern conquerors.  Just as this makes Romanians comfortable with 
joining European Union, it may eventually open them to European Union 
norms.  
Although European Union conditions are not effective in swaying 
individual Romanians’ attitudes towards corruption, the media may be 
influential.30  Entertainment showing people resisting bribes as it now 
shows them using condoms in love scenes, news reports of honest actions, 
                                                                                       
27 Sunstein, supra note 23, at 2049.   
28 E.g., in 2004, bribes accompanied 32% of citizens’ encounters with medical services; 
14%, with the legal system (5 year average) and 7%, with city hall; and 11%, with the 
police. MetroMedia Transilvania, Barometrul de Opinie Publica 53, at 
http://www.mmt.ro/Cercetari/bop%202004.pdf (Mai 2004). This is in contrast to 2000, 
where bribes were tied to 55% of citizens’ encounters with medical services; 24%, with 
the legal system, 12%, with city hall; and 20%, with the police. Open Society 
Foundation, Public Opinion Barometer 16, at 
http://www.mmt.ro/Cercetari/bop%202000.pdf (Mai 2004).  
29 See Tamvaki, supra note 20, at 17-18, 20.  
30 Michael McFaul, an expert on Russia, in referring to large-scale government 
corruption, contends that only an effective opposition party and a free press can stop 
corruption. E-mail from Michael McFaul, Peter and Helen Bing Senior Fellow, Hoover 
Institution, Stanford University, to Kandis Scott, Professor of Law, Santa Clara 
University School of Law (Aug. 8, 2004) (on file with author).    
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and public service advertisements can be more effective than law in 
reaching low level corruption.  Since our Conference, the European Union 
has moved in this direction.  It funded a media campaign launched by 
Transparency International to fight corruption in Romania.  The slogan is 
simple:  “don’t bribe.”  The effort includes a television program, web 
page, leaflets, and stage shows in thirteen towns.  A short television ad 
characterizes bureaucrats’ bribe taking as burglary.31  This is a clear 
attempt to change the public’s benign attitude towards corruption to one of 
hostility, like that towards theft.  
It is difficult for those committed to advancing the rule of law to 
acknowledge the inadequacy of law.  Nonetheless humility demands 
recognition that the power of social norms has overwhelmed legal attacks 
on petty corruption in Romania and other countries.  Alternatives aimed 
directly at underlying social attitudes have a greater likelihood of success.   
                                   
31 See Mihaela Gherghisan, Anti-corruption campaign launched in Romania, 
EUOBSERVER.COM, at http://euobserver.com/?sid=17&aid=17063 (Aug. 9, 2004). 
